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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the effect of international simple resale (ISR) 
authorization on the prices for international message telephone service (IMTS).  We 
compile a firm-level panel data set for over 200 United States-foreign country bilateral 
markets from 1995 to 2004.  These data provide detailed information on prices, variable 
costs, fixed costs and market shares for 75 firms for each bilateral market, as well as the 
timing of ISR authorization by the Federal Communications Commission for each 
bilateral market.  Estimates from a difference-in-differences model show that ISR 
authorization, and the associated lowering of barriers to entry, almost always results in 
lower prices for all markets.  Additionally, we find evidence that ISR authorization alters 
the relationship between market concentration and price.  Prior to ISR authorization more 
concentrated markets have higher prices.  ISR authorization dampens this effect and in 
some cases reverses the relationship so that market concentration is negatively correlated 
with IMTS prices set by incumbent firms. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1994 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) approved the practice of 
routing international telephone traffic over private lines, hereafter “international simple 
resale.”   International simple resale (ISR) reduces barriers to entry by allowing carriers 
to provide service over leased private lines instead of requiring outright ownership.  The 
FCC authorized ISR, on a country by country basis intending to encourage market entry, 
promote competition and increase service options for consumers.  This research project 
uses annual firm-level data from 1995 to 2004 to estimate the effect of ISR authorization 
on the prices for international message telephone service (IMTS). 
The unbundling of IMTS network elements, made possible with ISR 
authorization, has allowed potential new entrants to avoid the large sunk costs from 
investment in the network infrastructure typically required by incumbent facilities-based 
(FB) carriers.  New entrants can use ISR to provide IMTS by acquiring an international 
private line, and paying an access charge to connect this line with the networks of the 
originating and terminating countries.  While new entrants have initial start-up costs for 
marketing and billing infrastructure, and must purchase an exchange facility to connect 
individual network elements, these costs are relatively small compared to the fixed costs 
incurred with full FB entry.  Given mobile production factors, i.e., network access, and 
relatively costless entry and exit conditions, ISR authorization should be associated with 
relatively more entry in IMTS markets. 
IMTS provision is a classic example of markets where consumers have switching 
costs.  Economic models with switching costs indicate that market entry may influence 
the pricing decisions of incumbent firms by leading to either higher or lower prices.   
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The conventional result is that entry makes markets more competitive thus lowering 
incumbent prices.  Contrary to the conventional result Klemperer (1987), Farrell and 
Shapiro (1988) and Farrell and Klemperer (2007) show that incumbent firms may behave 
as fat-cats and increase their price in response to entry.  In addition incumbent firms may 
strategically respond to the threat of potential entry or future entry by limit pricing or 
limit over-pricing (Klemperer 1987).  With a limit pricing strategy, incumbent firms 
strategically lower their price to deter entry.  Once entry occurs the limit price is not 
maintained and the effect of entry is to increase the incumbent’s price.  With limit over-
pricing the effect of entry may be to decrease the incumbent’s price. 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of ISR authorization on IMTS 
prices.  We compile a firm-level panel data set for over 200 United States-foreign country 
bilateral markets from 1995 to 2004.  These data provide detailed information on prices, 
variable costs, fixed costs and market shares for 75 carriers, as well as the timing of FCC 
ISR authorization across all bilateral markets.2  We estimate a difference-in-differences 
(DID) model with these data to identify the price effects of ISR authorization in US-
foreign country IMTS markets.   
We find that ISR authorization, and the associated lowering of barriers to entry, 
resulted in lower prices in almost all markets.  Additionally, we find evidence that ISR 
authorization alters the relationship between market concentration and price.  Prior to ISR 
authorization more concentrated markets have higher prices.  ISR authorization dampens 
this effect and in some cases reverses the relationship so that market concentration is 
                                                 
2
 Among other things, the FCC considers the market-opening conditions of foreign telecommunications 
markets on a country by country basis, and whether they reciprocate conditions in United States markets, 
when deciding to authorize ISR.  The FCC made its first two ISR authorizations, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, in 1994.  At the end of 2003, there were 91 ISR-approved countries.  In 2004 the FCC eliminated 
its ISR policy effectively granting ISR authorization in all markets. 
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negatively correlated with IMTS prices set by incumbent firms.  For example, when 
evaluated at the sample’s 90th percentile value for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), the average price in markets with ISR authorization is about 13 cents per minute 
below the average price in markets without ISR.  When evaluated at the sample’s 10th 
percentile value for HHI, the average price in markets with ISR is about five cents per 
minute below the average price in markets without ISR.  These results suggest that in 
markets where ISR is permitted, the typical relationship between market concentration 
and price is altered and in some cases market concentration is negatively correlated with 
the IMTS prices set by incumbent firms. 
Several recent papers have also studied pricing in IMTS markets (See Madden 
and Savage, 2000; Ennis, 2006; and Ju and Tan, 2008).  Our paper differs from these by 
using a richer source of firm-level data for more foreign country markets and years.  
Other studies have also found that market entry and a lower level of market concentration 
are sometimes correlated with higher prices (See Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Ward et. al., 
2002; Perloff et. al., 2005; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; and Chen and Savage, 2009).  
Our paper contributes to this “competition increasing price” literature by offering new 
evidence from telephony markets, and by documenting price differences between ISR 
and non-ISR markets that vary systematically with the extent of market concentration.  
The evaluation of ISR is also important to policy makers.  Recently, the price of IMTS 
has declined.  However, the cost of international private lines used to provide IMTS 
service has significantly decreased as well, which means the overall effect of entry on 
prices is ambiguous.   
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical background 
motivating our empirical analysis.  Section 3 briefly describes some recent trends in 
United States IMTS markets and describes the data used in estimation.  Section 4 
presents the empirical model.  Section 5 reports the estimation results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
This section provides theoretical justification for why entry may increase or 
decrease incumbent’s prices in markets with consumer switching costs.  Incumbent firms 
may strategically respond to entry in the future or to the threat of potential entry.  
Klemperer’s (1987) model is adapted to show how incumbent firms respond to entry in 
the future.   To some extent, Klemperer’s (1987) model is similar to the models of Bulow 
et.al. (1985), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), and Klemperer (1988).  Similarities and 
differences between these models are discussed. 
In the basic model, there are two firms: an incumbent (I); and an entrant (E).  In 
the first period (1), the incumbent chooses a strategic variable, quantity or price, SI1, and 
then in the second period (2) both the incumbent and entrant choose strategic variables, 
SI2 and SE2, respectively.  A larger strategic variable indicates more aggressive behavior 
such that the strategic variable could be indicative of the firm’s quantity or the inverse of 
the firm’s price.  The incumbent’s discounted sum of profits is: 
 
where δ is the discount rate.  In the first period, the incumbent chooses  to maximize 
the discounted sum of profits and the first-order condition is as follows. 
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 (1) 
If firms do not behave strategically in the first period to entry in period 2,  =0 
(Klemperer 1987).  If firms behave strategically in the first period, then  and 
either incumbent firms use a limit pricing strategy or limit over-pricing to deter future 
entry.  An incumbent firm may use a limit pricing strategy when .  With a limit 
pricing strategy, the incumbent firm is overly aggressive in period 1 (SI1 is large) which 
leads to lower profits in the first period and makes the entrant less aggressive in the 
second period.  Alternatively when , an incumbent firm may use a limit over-
pricing strategy where the incumbent is less aggressive in period 1 (SI1 is small).  Being 
less aggressive in the first period, forces the incumbent to be more aggressive in the 
second period and the entrant knowing the incumbent will be aggressive is less 
aggressive otherwise.  Klemperer (1987) shows that when switching costs are sufficiently 
large a limit over-pricing strategy is not an equilibrium.   
Besides responding strategically to entry in the future, an incumbent firm will 
respond to actual entry once it occurs.  The conventional result is that entry makes 
markets more competitive and thus lowers the price.  In contrast to the conventional 
result, Rosenthal (1980) develops a model where entry causes the price to increase.  Entry 
increases the price when an incumbent cannot price discriminate between previous 
consumers who are locked-in and consumers with no lock-in.  As firms enter in 
Rosenthal’s model, the incumbent firm finds it more profitable to increase its price and 
tailor to consumers who are locked-in.   
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Farrell and Shapiro (1988) and Klemperer (1987) find the same result of entry 
increasing price with a switching costs model where new consumers enter the market 
each period.  New consumers are not locked-in to an incumbent while a firm’s previous 
consumers are locked-in.  With entry, incumbent firms concede new consumers to the 
entrant while raising prices and exploiting the lock-in of their previous consumers.  
Incumbents behaving in this fashion are referred to as “fat-cats” (Farrell and Klemperer 
2007).  
Whether or not firms are responding to entry in the future or entry as it occurs, 
entry may either increase or decrease an incumbent’s price.  If incumbent firms limit 
price to deter entry or act as fat-cats, the effect of entry will be to increase an incumbent’s 
price.  With limit pricing incumbent firms set an artificially low price to deter entry and 
once entry actually occurs the incentives to maintaining a limit price are eliminated.  If 
incumbent firms limit over-price or markets become more competitive with entry, then 
entry will decrease the price. 
For IMTS markets, ISR authorization both increases the probability of entry in the 
future and causes actual entry to occur.  The effect of ISR authorization may be to either 
increase or decrease an incumbent’s price.  ISR authorization will increase an 
incumbent’s price if incumbents behave as fat-cats or use a limit pricing strategy.  ISR 
authorization will decrease an incumbent’s price if markets become more competitive 
with entry.  When estimating the effect of ISR on incumbent prices in IMTS markets, a 
positive effect could be attributed to either a limit pricing strategy or fat-cat behavior.  A 
negative effect of ISR indicates that markets become more competitive with entry. 
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3. Data 
3.1 IMTS market trends 
Figures 1 through Figure 3 provide a recent overview of United States IMTS 
markets.  Figure 1 shows that over time the average revenue per minute of IMTS 
decreases while the number of minutes increases.  It is important to note that the price of 
IMTS is not necessarily decreasing because of ISR authorization, although the dramatic 
decrease in price after 1994 tends to be associated with the FCC’s first ISR authorizations 
for Canada and the United Kingdom.  Figure 2 shows that the average revenue received 
by carriers for providing private line capacity has also decreased over time which 
indicates that the cost of providing IMTS is decreasing.  The decline in the price of IMTS 
could just as easily be explained by a reduction in costs as it could be attributed to ISR 
authorization.  Note that in Figure 2, the average revenue for private lines to Canada and 
Mexico are not decreasing over time as these lines are mostly terrestrial unlike the other 
categories.  Figure 3 shows substantial growth in international capacity since 1995. 
 
3.2 Data sources 
We use the Section 43.61 International Traffic Data Reports published by the 
FCC to develop a firm-level panel data set for over 200 United States-foreign country 
bilateral markets from 1995 to 2004.  Our panel starts with 1995 because this was the 
first year the FCC published the number of voice equivalent circuits along with private 
line revenues which is used to approximate the upper bound of a carriers fixed cost.  
While Section 43.61 International Traffic Data Reports are available for years after 2004, 
many carriers requested and were granted confidential treatment of their Section 43.61 
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filings after 2004.  This results in about 35% of the reported revenues being censored 
from the 2005 report while less than 3.6% of the reported revenues were censored from 
the 2004 report.  Appendix A of the published reports from the FCC indicates the number 
of phone calls, number of minutes, carrier revenues and interconnection costs for each 
firm in each market.  Appendix B indicates the number of voice equivalent international 
circuits leased for each firm in each market and the associated revenues.  We use these 
data to calculate the price, variable cost, market share and fixed cost for all FB firms and 
facilities-resale (FR) firms in each market for each year.  We also use the FCC’s 
International Bureau International Simple Resale web site to measure the timing of FCC 
ISR authorization for each bilateral market.   
 
3.3 Sample 
The initial dataset is comprised of 28,090 annual firm observations for IMTS 
service between the United States and 239 “international points.”  17 of these 
international points are within the United States and associated territories and were 
removed from the sample.  The remaining 222 US-foreign country bilateral markets were 
served by 75 carriers, ranging from one carrier serving North Korea at 1995 in 27 carriers 
serving the United Kingdom in 1997.  Because carriers sometimes misreport their 
revenue and telephone traffic, which we use to construct our price variable, we also 
removed the highest five percent of price values from the sample.  The net sample of data 
therefore comprised of 25,777 annual price observations by 75 firms across 218 bilateral 
markets from 1995 to 2004. 
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3.4 Variables and summary statistics 
Table 1 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis and Table 2 presents 
summary statistics for these variables.  The average per minute price for an IMTS call 
between 1995 and 2004 is 58 cents per minute.  The average cost of terminating a call at 
the foreign destination was 31 cents per minute.  In 1995, two counties had obtained ISR 
authorization from the FCC: Canada and the United Kingdom.  By the end of 2003, 91 
countries had obtained FCC authorization.3  In 2004 the FCC eliminated its ISR policy 
effectively granting ISR authorization in all markets.  The average value of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (multiplied by 100) over the sample period is 33.25 
indicating a high degree of average concentration. 
 
4 Empirical Model 
4.1 Model 
We estimate the effects of ISR with a DID model that compares the prices of 
incumbent facilities-based firms operating in bilateral markets with ISR authorization to 
the prices of incumbents operating in markets without ISR.  The model for firm i in 
market j at year t is: 
 ijt jt jt ijt i t ijtPRICE = βISR + δHHI + θCOST + α + η + ε        (2) 
where PRICE is the real price per minute for a call from the United States to foreign 
country j.  ISR equals one if the FCC authorized international simple resale and zero 
otherwise.  HHI is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of market concentration.  COST is the 
                                                 
3
 Note that the Philippines is an exception as the FCC authorized ISR in this market in 2000 and then 
revoked ISR authorization in 2003. 
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real cost per minute for terminating a call from the United States to foreign country j.  
The α’s are firm fixed effects, the η’s are year fixed effects and ε is an error. 
The parameter of interest is ∂PRICEi/∂ISR = β.  All other things being equal, the 
estimate of β shows the difference in incumbent’s prices due to ISR authorization.  A 
finding of β < 0 indicates that low-cost market entry, as measured by ISR authorization, 
decreases the incumbent’s prices.  This result is consistent with the notion that lower 
barriers to entry make IMTS markets more competitive.  Conversely, a finding of β > 0 
indicates that ISR authorization increases an incumbent’s price.  This result is consistent 
with competition increasing the price whereby a strategic incumbent raises prices with 
entry because it has been practicing limit pricing or the incumbent is a fat-cat.  Additional 
insight into potential competition increasing the price effect can be gleamed from an 
alternative specification of the price equation that includes an interaction term, so that: 
 ijt jt jt jt jt ijt i t ijtPRICE = βISR + δHHI +ψ(ISR ×HHI ) + θCOST + α + η + ε   
For example, an estimate of ψ < 0 would suggest that in markets where ISR is permitted, 
increased competition, as measured by a decrease in market concentration, can actually 
raise IMTS prices.  An estimate of ψ < 0 would also suggest that in markets where ISR is 
permitted, a greater degree of market concentration may lead to a lower price. 
The DID estimate(s) of β (and ψ) is (are) consistent when ISR authorization is 
randomly assigned between bilateral markets.  Policy endogeneity can arise when 
unobserved time varying market factors affect the timing of the FCC’s ISR authorization 
decision.  One way to minimize this bias is with instrumental variables.  However, 
finding market-level economic and political instruments that are significant determinants 
of ISR authorization, but are not correlated with prices is difficult.  Alternatively, it is 
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possible to decompose the error term into observed and unobserved market-time 
components that may be correlated with PRICE and ISR so that: 
ijt jt jt ijtε = Z λ +TREND τ + e   
where Z is a vector of observed market-time variables that control for regulatory and 
political-economy factors that may be correlated with ISR authorization,, TREND is a 
vector of market-specific time trends that control for unobserved foreign country market 
effects that vary through time and e is an error term. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
The empirical model and data described above are used to empirically examine 
the effects of ISR authorization on United States IMTS prices.  We estimate several 
alternative model specifications of the price equations (2) and (3). First, we estimate the 
full sample of the data and secondly, on a sub-sample of “high income”/“high revenue” 
markets.   
5.1 Full sample estimates 
DID model estimates on the full sample of 218 US-foreign country markets are 
presented in Table 3.  Because our observations represent firms in bilateral markets, it is 
possible that there are shocks that are common or correlated across firms within markets.  
While this does not affect the consistency of our estimator, it does impact the standard 
error.  To address this issue, we allow correlations in the residuals across firms in the 
same market when computing these standard errors.  This is reasonable, for example, if 
some unobservable characteristics of firm pricing behavior are determined at the market 
level. 
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The first column shows the coefficient estimates and standard errors for model (i), 
the baseline specification (2) without the interaction term.  As expected, the estimated 
coefficients on COST and HHI are both positive and significant at least the five percent 
level.  The estimated coefficient on ISR is negative (β = -0.1956) and significant at the 
one percent level.  This finding indicates that, all other things being equal ISR 
authorization, and the resulting lower barriers to market entry, decrease the incumbent’s 
prices by about 20 cents per minute.  Given that the average price per minute for the full 
sample of foreign country markets is 51 cents, this represents about a 40 percent 
difference in prices.   
The results above may mask differences in prices due to the combination of ISR 
authorization and the extent of competition within each foreign country market, as 
measured by the index of market concentration (HHI).  Model (ii) estimates, reported in 
column two, measure this interaction effect by including ISR×HHI in the specification of 
IMTS prices.  We first observe that the estimated coefficients on COST and HHI are 
similar to those reported for model (i).  We also continue to observe a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of β = -0.1446 on ISR.  Interestingly, the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term ISR× HHI is also negative (ψ = -0.0018) and 
significant at the one percent level. 
Specification’s (iii) and (iv) include additional controls for the potential policy 
endogeneity of the FCC’s decision to permit ISR authorization.  Model (iii) controls for 
observed market-time factors that may be correlated with prices and ISR with PLINE 
(real private line revenue per 64 kbps voice equivalent circuit), which is an upper-bound 
proxy for the cost of renting private line capacity between the United states and foreign 
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countries.4  The results, reported in column three, show a positive and significant 
relationship between PLINE and PRICE.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients for COST, 
HHI and ISR are qualitatively similar to those reported for model (ii). 
Model (iv) adds a vector of country-specific time trends to (iii) to control for 
unobserved foreign country market effects that vary through time.  In this model 
specification, we observe a noticeable change in both the sign and magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient on ISR.  The estimated individual effect of international simple 
resale is now positive and close to zero (β = 0.0015), and is not significantly different 
from zero.  However, the estimate of ISR× HHI is negative and significant at the one 
percent level.  Taken together, these estimates give rise to ∂PRICE/∂ISR = 0.0015 – 
0.0027HHI.  This result suggests that the effect of ISR on firm prices becomes more 
positive with greater facilities-based competition, as measured by a decrease in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration.  When evaluated at the sample’s 
90th percentile value for HHI (i.e., 48.46), the average price in markets with ISR 
authorization is about 13 cents per minute below the average price in markets without 
ISR.  When evaluated at the sample’s 10th percentile value for HHI (i.e., 20), the average 
price in markets with ISR is about five cents per minute below the average price in 
markets without ISR.  These results suggest that in markets where ISR is permitted, 
competitive markets with a lower degree of market concentration are characterized by 
higher IMTS prices than more concentrated markets. 
                                                 
4
 To control for demand-side effects that vary across countries and through time, we are currently 
augmenting our firm data with information on gross domestic product, number of telephone lines and 
international trade, obtained at the foreign country level from the World Bank (2009) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (2009). GDP is the real gross domestic product per capita of foreign country j, 
LINES is the number of telephone lines in foreign country j, and TRADE is the sum of exports and imports 
between the United States and foreign country j. We are also constructing an additional cost control that 
varies across countries and through time, CAP, which is the capacity in bits per second between the United 
States and foreign country j. 
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An alternative way to interpret these results is to examine the sign of 
∂PRICE/∂HHI, where ∂PRICE/∂HHI = 0.0024 – 0.0039ISR  from Model (iv).  The 
expected sign of ∂PRICE/∂HHI is positive so that prices are higher in markets which are 
more concentrated.  In markets where ISR is not permitted, ∂PRICE/∂HHI is positive as 
expected, but this result is revered for markets where ISR is authorized.  Even in Model 
(ii) and Model (iii), the sign of ψ is negative indicating that ISR authorization 
fundamentally changes the relationship between market concentration and price. 
 
5.2 Sub sample estimates 
Economic theory suggests that the effect of competition on prices may vary across 
high and low-revenue markets.  To account for this source of heterogeneity, we estimate 
the DID model on a sub sample of 99 US-foreign country “high income” markets.  A 
market is classified as high income when the gross national income per capita of the 
foreign country is greater than $3,856, as defined by the World Bank (2009). 
Sub sample estimates are reported in columns one through four in Table 4.  
Overall, the estimates have a similar a qualitative flavor to those reported for the full 
sample in Table 3.  Focusing on the results for model (iv), we observe that estimated 
coefficients on ISR and ISR× HHI give rise to ∂PRICE/∂ISR = 0.0025 – 0.0039HHI.  
When evaluated at the sample’s 90th percentile value for HHI (i.e., 44.52), the average 
price in markets with ISR authorization is about 17 cents per minute below the average 
price in markets without ISR.  When evaluated at the sample’s 10th percentile value for 
HHI (i.e., 20.95), the average price in markets with ISR is about eight cents per minute 
above the average price in markets without ISR.  Similar to the full sample estimates, 
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these results suggest that in markets where ISR is permitted, competition in high-revenue 
markets is positively correlated with IMTS prices for incumbent firms.  These results also 
suggest that ISR authorization changes the expected relationship between market 
concentration and price. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has empirically examined the effects of ISR authorization on IMTS 
prices for the United States.  We find that ISR authorization, and the associated lowering 
of barriers to entry, resulted in lower prices in almost all markets.  Additionally, we find 
evidence that ISR authorization alters the relationship between market concentration and 
price.  Prior to ISR authorization more concentrated markets have higher prices.  ISR 
authorization dampens this effect and in some cases reverses the relationship so that 
market concentration is negatively correlated with IMTS prices set by incumbent firms.  
In summary, our preliminary results provide some additional evidence for the 
competition increasing price literature by showing that in some markets where ISR is 
permitted, competition is positively correlated with IMTS prices.  Future work will 
consider additional controls for the potential endogeneity of ISR authorization and 
appropriate robustness checks.  More insight would also be obtained by linking the 
empirical results more tightly to the theoretical literature. 
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Table 1. Price equations variables 
Variable Description and data source 
PRICE 
 
 
Real price per minute for an IMTS call from the U.S. to foreign country j; 
(outgoing revenue / outgoing minutes) / GNP deflator. Source: FCC Section 
43.61 International Traffic Data Reports. 
ISR 
 
 
One when foreign country j has obtained ISR authorization from the FCC and 
zero otherwise. Source: FCC International Bureau International Simple 
Resale. 
HHI 
 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for traffic from the U.S. to foreign country j 
multiplied by 100. Source: FCC Section 43.61 International Traffic Data 
Reports. 
COST 
 
 
Real cost per minute for terminating an IMTS call from the U.S. to foreign 
country j; (outgoing payments / outgoing minutes) / GNP deflator. Source: 
FCC Section 43.61 International Traffic Data Reports. 
PLINE 
 
 
Real cost of private line voice equivalent circuit from the U.S. to foreign 
country j; (total private line revenue for all firms / number of 64 kbps voice 
equivalent circuits) / GNP deflator. Source: FCC Section 43.61 International 
Traffic Data Reports. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRICE ($) 25,777 0.5830 0.5095 9.26e-07 2.2845 
ISR 25,777 0.2635 0.4125 0 1 
HHI 25,777 33.355 13.512 0.5749 100 
COST ($) 25,777 0.3052 0.6013 0 55.17 
PLINE ($) 19,727 16,354 41,819 21.305 1,074,458 
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Table 3. DID model estimates with full sample of countries 1995-2004 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ISR    -0.1956*** 
(0.0205) 
   -0.1446*** 
(0.0221) 
   -0.1474*** 
(0.0257) 
0.0015 
(0.0285) 
HHI     0.0018*** 
(0.0004) 
    0.0020*** 
(0.0004) 
    0.0030*** 
(0.0005) 
    0.0018*** 
(0.0004) 
ISR× HHI  
 
   -0.0018*** 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0013* 
(0.0078) 
  -0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
COST   0.1435** 
(0.0601) 
  0.1432** 
(0.0601) 
  0.1259** 
(0.0635) 
 0.1043* 
(0.0581) 
PLINE (Z)  
 
 
 
  5.39e-07*** 
(7.32e-08) 
  3.09e-07*** 
(8.47e-08) 
CONSTANT 
 
    1.0051*** 
(0.0686) 
    0.9948*** 
(0.0694) 
    0.9295*** 
(0.0760) 
    1.0846*** 
(0.0862) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country specific trends No No No Yes 
Within R2 0.370 0.370 0.386 0.432 
Number of firms 73 73 73 73 
Number of countries 218 218 192 192 
Number of observations 25,777 25,777 19,727 19,727 
NOTES. Dependent variable is PRICE. ***significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 
level; *significant at the 0.1 level; Robust standard errors (s.e.) in parenthesis are clustered at the 
firm level. Estimates of fixed effects and trends not reported. 
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Table 4. DID model estimates with “high-income” countries 1995-2004 
 Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
ISR    -0.1496*** 
(0.0200) 
   -0.0879*** 
(0.0255) 
   -0.0803*** 
(0.0284) 
0.0205 
(0.0372) 
HHI     0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 
    0.0024*** 
(0.0007) 
    0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
    0.0024*** 
(0.0009) 
ISR× HHI  
 
   -0.0021*** 
(0.0008) 
 -0.0024** 
(0.0009) 
  -0.0039*** 
(0.0012) 
COST   0.2248** 
(0.1026) 
  0.2239** 
(0.1025) 
  0.2078** 
(0.1039) 
 0.1892* 
(0.0971) 
PLINE (Z)  
 
 
 
  5.85e-07*** 
(8.21e-08) 
  3.09e-07*** 
(8.47e-08) 
CONSTANT 
 
    0.8540*** 
(0.0692) 
    0.8334*** 
(0.0689) 
    0.8178*** 
(0.0705) 
    0.9177*** 
(0.0777) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country specific trends No No No Yes 
Within R2 0.386 0.387 0.392 0.432 
Number of firms 71 71 73 73 
Number of countries 218 218 192 192 
Number of observations 13,368 13,368 11,768 11,768 
Number of observations 13,368 13,368 11,768 11,768 
NOTES. Dependent variable is PRICE. ***significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 
level; *significant at the 0.1 level; Robust standard errors (s.e.) in parenthesis are clustered at the 
firm level. Estimates of fixed effects and trends not reported. Sub sample of upper middle and high 
income countries according to the World Bank (2009). 
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Figure 1. IMTS minutes and revenue 1980 to 2004 
 
Source: FCC 2005 
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Figure 2. Average revenue per voice equivalent circuit 
 
Source: FCC 2005 
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Figure 3. Voice equivalent international circuits by use of circuit 
 
Source: FCC 2005 
 
 
